CWE-1310 Base Draft

Missing Ability to Patch ROM Code

A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.

Definition

What is CWE-1310?

A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
Many secure systems start by running foundational code from an immutable ROM, which establishes a hardware Root of Trust. Since this ROM code is permanently etched into the chip during manufacturing, any security flaws discovered after the device ships become permanent. This creates a critical, unchangeable weakness in every deployed unit. Without a built-in patching capability for this ROM stage, the entire system remains vulnerable to exploitation. Attackers can target these unfixable flaws to compromise the boot process, potentially bypassing all subsequent security layers and taking full control of the SoC.
Real-world impact

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1310

No public CVE references are linked to this CWE in MITRE's catalog yet.

How attackers exploit it

Step-by-step attacker path

  1. 1

    A System-on-Chip (SOC) implements a Root-of-Trust (RoT) in ROM to boot secure code. However, at times this ROM code might have security vulnerabilities and need to be patched. Since ROM is immutable, it can be impossible to patch.

  2. 2

    ROM does not have built-in application-programming interfaces (APIs) to patch if the code is vulnerable. Implement mechanisms to patch the vulnerable ROM code.

  3. 3

    The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.

  4. 4

    The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].

Vulnerable code example

Vulnerable Verilog

The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.

Vulnerable Verilog 
...

```
   bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
   );
   bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
   );
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_linux : rom_rdata_linux;** 
 ...
Secure code example

Secure Verilog

The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].

Secure Verilog 
...

```
   bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
   );
   bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
  	 .clk_i ,
  	 .req_i ( rom_req ),
  	 .addr_i ( rom_addr ),
  	 .rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
   );
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_patch : rom_rdata_linux;** 
 ...
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist

How to prevent CWE-1310

  • Architecture and Design / Implementation Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot.
  • Architecture and Design / Implementation Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.
Detection signals

How to detect CWE-1310

SAST High

Run static analysis (SAST) on the codebase looking for the unsafe pattern in the data flow.

DAST Moderate

Run dynamic application security testing against the live endpoint.

Runtime Moderate

Watch runtime logs for unusual exception traces, malformed input, or authorization bypass attempts.

Code review Moderate

Code review: flag any new code that handles input from this surface without using the validated framework helpers.

Plexicus auto-fix

Plexicus auto-detects CWE-1310 and opens a fix PR in under 60 seconds.

Codex Remedium scans every commit, identifies this exact weakness, and ships a reviewer-ready pull request with the patch. No tickets. No hand-offs.

Get a demo Try Plexicus free
Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

What is CWE-1310?

A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.

How serious is CWE-1310?

MITRE has not published a likelihood-of-exploit rating for this weakness. Treat it as medium-impact until your threat model proves otherwise.

What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-1310?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, System on Chip.

How can I prevent CWE-1310?

Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot. Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.

How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-1310?

Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-1310 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.

Where can I learn more about CWE-1310?

MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1310.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.

Related weaknesses

Weaknesses related to CWE-1310

CWE-1329 Parent

Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable

This vulnerability occurs when a product depends on a component that cannot be updated or patched to fix security flaws or critical bugs.

CWE-1277 Sibling

Firmware Not Updateable

This vulnerability occurs when a hardware product lacks a mechanism for users to install firmware updates, leaving known security flaws…

Resources

Further reading

Ready when you are

Don't Let Security
Weigh You Down.

Stop choosing between AI velocity and security debt. Plexicus is the only platform that runs Vibe Coding Security and ASPM in parallel — one workflow, every codebase.

Get started free Book a demo