- Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. - Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. - Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
CWE-1330 Variant Draft
Remanent Data Readable after Memory Erase
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
Definition
What is CWE-1330?
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
Data remanence happens when memory hardware doesn't completely eliminate stored information during a standard erase operation. This can occur due to performance-focused designs that only clear organizational metadata (like file pointers) while leaving the actual data intact, or due to the physical properties of memory types like SRAM and DRAM, where residual electrical charge can retain data. To counter this, memory devices often provide separate 'secure erase' commands designed to overwrite the actual data cells.
For robust protection, especially in self-encrypting storage devices, a 'cryptographic erase' is used. This method doesn't overwrite the encrypted data on the physical media; instead, it permanently deletes the decryption keys. Since the remaining data is still encrypted, protection relies entirely on the strength of the encryption algorithm. Therefore, understanding your hardware's specific erase capabilities is critical for ensuring data is truly irrecoverable.
Real-world impact
Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1330
-
Firmware Data Deletion Vulnerability in which a base station factory reset might not delete all user information. The impact of this enables a new owner of a used device that has been "factory-default reset" with a vulnerable firmware version can still retrieve, at least, the previous owner's wireless network name, and the previous owner's wireless security (such as WPA2) key. This issue was addressed with improved, data deletion.
How attackers exploit it
Step-by-step attacker path
- 1
Consider a device that uses flash memory for non-volatile-data storage. To optimize flash-access performance or reliable-flash lifetime, the device might limit the number of flash writes/erases by maintaining some state in internal SRAM and only committing changes to flash memory periodically.
- 2
The device also supports user reset to factory defaults with the expectation that all personal information is erased from the device after this operation. On factory reset, user files are erased using explicit, erase commands supported by the flash device.
- 3
In the given, system design, the flash-file system can support performance-optimized erase such that only the file metadata are erased and not the content. If this optimized erase is used for files containing user data during factory-reset flow, then device, flash memory can contain remanent data from these files.
- 4
On device-factory reset, the implementation might not erase these copies, since the file organization has changed and the flash file system does not have the metadata to track all previous copies.
- 5
A flash-memory region that is used by a flash-file system should be fully erased as part of the factory-reset flow. This should include secure-erase flow for the flash media such as overwriting patterns multiple times followed by erase.
Vulnerable code example
Vulnerable pseudo
MITRE has not published a code example for this CWE. The pattern below is illustrative — see Resources for canonical references.
// Example pattern — see MITRE for the canonical references.
function handleRequest(input) {
// Untrusted input flows directly into the sensitive sink.
return executeUnsafe(input);
} Secure code example
Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
return executeWithGuards(safe);
} What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Prevention checklist
How to prevent CWE-1330
- Architecture and Design - Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with known patterns and of erasing actual content. - Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting, memory devices. - External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). - Physical destruction of media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.
Detection signals
How to detect CWE-1330
- Testing of memory-device contents after clearing or erase commands. - Dynamic analysis of memory contents during device operation to detect specific, confidential assets. - Architecture and design analysis of memory clear and erase operations.
Plexicus auto-detects CWE-1330 and opens a fix PR in under 60 seconds.
Codex Remedium scans every commit, identifies this exact weakness, and ships a reviewer-ready pull request with the patch. No tickets. No hand-offs.
Frequently asked questions What is CWE-1330?
How serious is CWE-1330?
What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-1330?
How can I prevent CWE-1330?
How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-1330?
Where can I learn more about CWE-1330?
Frequently asked questions
What is CWE-1330?
Sensitive data stored in memory hardware can still be accessed or reconstructed even after a standard clear or erase command has been executed.
How serious is CWE-1330?
MITRE has not published a likelihood-of-exploit rating for this weakness. Treat it as medium-impact until your threat model proves otherwise.
What languages or platforms are affected by CWE-1330?
MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Security Hardware, Not Technology-Specific.
How can I prevent CWE-1330?
- Support for secure-erase commands that apply multiple cycles of overwriting memory with known patterns and of erasing actual content. - Support for cryptographic erase in self-encrypting, memory devices. - External, physical tools to erase memory such as ultraviolet-rays-based erase of Electrically erasable, programmable, read-only memory (EEPROM). - Physical destruction of media device. This is done for repurposed or scrapped devices that are no longer in use.
How does Plexicus detect and fix CWE-1330?
Plexicus's SAST engine matches the data-flow signature for CWE-1330 on every commit. When a match is found, our Codex Remedium agent opens a fix PR with the corrected code, tests, and a one-line summary for the reviewer.
Where can I learn more about CWE-1330?
MITRE publishes the canonical definition at https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1330.html. You can also reference OWASP and NIST documentation for adjacent guidance.
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